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COMPARATIVE LAW BEYOND POST-MODERNISM
ANNE PETERS* and HEINER SCHWENKE**
INTRODUCTION
THE legal version of post-modernism has not failed to challenge
comparative law. It points out that, traditionally, comparatists have
participated in a project of objectivity, universalism and neutrality of law,
of which the "new" approach to comparative law is altogether sceptical.1
In the era of globalisation, both the discipline and its critique have gained
relevance. What the transition of post-socialist countries and the unifi-
cation of Europe have effected regionally, globalisation now
accomplishes on a global scale: it creates desires for harmonisation and, as
a pre-requisite, legal comparison. However, not only the technical
function of comparative law is needed, but also its critical potential. In the
process of globalisation, different legal systems and different cultures are
confronted with each other and must interact. This provokes new
questions about the options and limits of comparative law and legal
unification, regarding, for instance, the applicability of specific moral and
legal standards to other cultures by comparatists and law-makers. These
questions are all the more pressing as we begin to realise that governing
globalisation, in particular economic globalisation, with the help of global
law perhaps requires a concept of a global legal order which is based on a
"global legal pluralism".2
Challengers of the allegedly "ideological, methodologically flawed, and
theoretically vacuous"3 traditional comparative law call their approach a
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1. David Kennedy, "New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and Inter-
national Governance", (1997) Utah LRcv. 545 at p.548.
2. Francis Snyder, "Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and
European Law", (1999) 5 Eur.LJ. 334-374.
3. GUnter Frankenberg, "Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in Comparative
Law", (1997) Utah LRev. 259 at p.265; see also Jonathan Hill, "Comparative Law, Law
Reform, and Legal Theory", (1989) 9 Oxford J.Leg.Stud. 101 at p.113: "[Comparative law
in its 'applied version'... is faced by very serious, if not insoluble theoretical problems".
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"critical" one,4 a "new approach",5 a "cultural immersion approach"6 or
"engaged comparativism",7 while others have named those scholars,
"discourse analysts",8 or—after a seminal conference at the University of
Utah in October 1996—the "'Utah' group".9 The alternative new
approaches have brought to comparative scholarship the tools of critical
theory, feminism, literary theory, and postcolonial theory. Our article
concentrates on specific features of those approaches and tools which we
will gather under the label "post-modernist". This is of course a
simplification which probably does not do justice to all facets and strands
of new scholarship. Some of the authors we quote would perhaps not call
themselves post-modernists.10 Also, we shall speak of the post-modernist
argument, although there are many variations, which may be more
nuanced than the aggressive version we are depicting here. However, we
consider that simplification justified for the sake of clarity of the
argument, which addresses only basic assumptions, and not their refined
derivations.
Post-modernism is a highly ambiguous term, whose meaning depends
on the discipline (literary theory, architecture, philosophy etc.) in which it
is used, and on the prior notions of "modernism" and "modernity".
Roughly speaking, post-modernist thought considers as basic the ex-
perience of plurality and difference. It points out that there are highly
diverse forms of knowledge, systems of morality, personal plans of life
and behavioural patterns. Post-modernist theory welcomes these hetero-
geneous positions and finds their discordance absolute. It protests against
4. Seminal GQnter Frankenberg, "Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law",
(1985) 26 Harv.lnt'l LJ. 411-455; see also Nathaniel Berman, "Aftershocks: Exoticization,
Normalization, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion" (1997) Utah LRev. 281 at p.281.
5. See the Symposium "New Approaches to Comparative Law", held at the Utah Law
School in October 1996, papers published in (1997) Utah LRev. 259elseq.
6. Vivian Grosswald Curran, "Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law", (1998) 46 AmJ.Comp.L 43, esp. at pp.50-54.
7. Berman supra n.4 at p.283: "there is no safe anchor, only engagement" {idem).
8. Annelise Riles, "Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Infor-
mation", (1999) 40 Harv.lnt'l L.R. 221 at pp.246-250. Riles paints a picture of currently
three communities of comparative law ("traditional" comparative lawyers, "new
approaches", and specialists in particular bodies of non-westem law), arguing that trie three
approaches are not so divergent as their proponents imagine because all scholars share the
same passion for looking beyond and understanding differences. Idem at pp.221-283.
9. Nora Demleitner, "Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Compara-
tive Law", (1998) 46 AmJ.Comp.L 647 at p.648. Demleitner identifies three groups in the
US-American academy: the establishment, the comparative law and economics group, and
the critical "Utah" group.
10. Explicitly post-modernist however, Janet E. Ainsworth, "Categories and Culture: On
the 'Rectification of Names' in Comparative Law", (1996) 82 Cornell LR. 19 at pp.24-25.
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the totalising monopolisation of certain types of rationality and against
universalist concepts that raise false allegations of absoluteness."
Correspondingly, post-modernist criticism of traditional comparative
law starts from the premise that reasoning, language and judgement are
determined by inescapable and incommensurable epistemic, linguistic,
cultural and moral frameworks. According to this theory, which we shall
refer to as "framework-theory",12 legal comparison is trapped in cultural
frameworks.
Comparative law is particularly vulnerable to the post-modernist
critique. On a surface level, some favourite themes of post-modernists
relate very obviously to our discipline. For instance, the post-modernists'
focus on the Other is acute because comparative law, by definition, deals
with the Other, being concerned with the differences between east and
west, between common and civil law, between "us" and "them"; the
"comparative enterprise is thus permeated by the other"."
But the challenge goes deeper. The backbone to topoi such as the
"Other", "difference", "categories" and "power", the framework-theory,
actually calls into question the very essence of comparative legal
scholarship. Until now, comparative study was all about exploring and
transcending frameworks. Comparative law has been considered the
specific tool to overcome parochialism, to become exposed, to enable
distancing, to ultimately free observers from the narrow confines of their
cultural disposition. To say that the comparatist is trapped in her
framework casts fundamental doubts on this tool. The alleged incommen-
surability of frameworks means nothing else but total incomparability
across history and culture. Because of irreconcilable differences, the
comparatist cannot know, let alone compare and adjudicate different
legal cultures. In short: incommensurability implies failure of comparison.
Part I of our article gives an overview of universalist strands in the
comparative tradition (enlightenment, historicism, unificatory enthusi-
asm, and functionalism). In Part II, we review the post-modernist critique
and respond to it. We refute the framework-theory by demonstrating that
the relativism it builds on is not viable (Part II.l). We then discuss four
other objections against traditional comparative law, which are—for the
most part—closely related to the framework-theory. The first is the
assertion that any comparative investigation is unavoidably biased (the
bias-argument, Part II.2). Next we discuss the allegation that traditional
comparative law obeys a secret political agenda of hegemony and
11. Wolfgang Welsch, Unsere postmodeme Moderne, 4th ed. (1993) at pp.4-7; sec also
Elizabeth Deed Ermarth, "Postmodernism", in Edward Craig (Ed.) Routledge Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy 7 (1998), 587-590 with further references.
12. We borrow this term from Karl Popper. See Karl Popper, The Myth of the Framework:
In defence of Science and Rationality (1994).
13. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.45.
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domination (the hegemony-argument, Part n.3). We then turn to the
critique of comparative categories and classifications (contempt of
classifications, Part II.4). Then, we discuss the critical assertion that the
traditional functionalist approach to comparative law belies deep differ-
ences between legal cultures, is inescapably subjective, only seemingly
technical/apolitical and betrays a limited vision of the law (contempt of
functionalism, Part IL5). To conclude, we suggest a methodology which
takes into due consideration the post-modernist criticism and avoids its
exaggerations and absurdities (Part III).
I. THE CHALLENGED TRADITION: BELIEF IN UNIVERSAL LAW AND
JUSTICE
1. Enlightenment
European comparative legal studies began with universalist aspirations in
search of, so to speak, the lost unity of natural law. This was in the first half
of the 19th century, when the great codifications in Bavaria, Prussia,
France and Austria created diverse positive legal rules for specific
territories, when the belief in one universal natural (divine) law was
declining, and when even the ideal unity of the ius commune Europaeum
had vanished.14 Comparison of the existing bodies of positive law had
primarily idealist, rational, liberal, and enlightened motives. Compara-
tists tended to believe in the common nature of man as a rational being,
they were mostly liberals (in the European sense) who favoured modern
parliamentary legislation and studied foreign examples in search of
material for codification, including projected constitutions.15
2. Historicism
The second strand of universalism in comparative studies was historicism,
which in the 19th century became the leading paradigm of almost all
sciences.16 Legal comparison (including historical comparison) was
undertaken in order to construe a necessary progress of legal evolution. A
good example is Eduard Gans' "Law of Succession in Universal-
Historical Evolution: A Treatise of Universal History". Under this
programmatic heading, Gans treated Roman, Indian, Chinese, Mosaic,
Muslim and Attic law of heritage, explicitly relying on Hegel's philosophy
14. Michael Stolleis, NationalUSt und IntemationalitSt: Rtchttvergleichung im dffentlichen
Recht da 19. Jahrhunderts (1998) at pp.7-8.
15. Idem at p.10.
16. The historicist drive of 19th century comparative scholarship was so pervasive that
even in 1903 Frederick Pollock wrote: "It makes no great difference whether we speak of
historical jurisprudence or of comparative jurisprudence, or, as the Germans seem inclined
to do, of the general history of law." Frederick Pollock, "The History of Comparative
Jurisprudence", (1903) 5 Journal SocComp.Leg. 2ndser. 74 at p.76.
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of history as a theoretical foundation." Another leading comparatist of
that period, Josef Kohler, wrote in his "Introduction to Comparative
Law": "[W]e see how the immanent aspiration to development in the
organism called mankind unconsciously sprouts and bears fruit, we see
how above all individual reason the higher reasonableness pervades
mankind and directs history".18 Kohler's world-view has been rightly
characterised as "historical optimism";19 and such optimism was shared
by others, such as John Stuart Mill, who observed in 1848: "It is hardly
possible to overstate the value... of placing human beings in contact with
persons dissimilar from themselves, and with modes of thought and action
unlike those with which they are familiar. ... Such communication has
always been ... one of the primary sources of progress."20
The idea of organic evolution of the law led jurists to look for basic
structures of the law, for a "morphology" of the law, of the State, etc.21
Lawyers searched and constructed such evolutionary patterns in order to
find the "right law".22 Thus in the first volume (1878) of the newly founded
journal "Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft", one of the
editors formulated the objectives of comparative legal studies entirely
within the evolutionary paradigm: "[C]omparative law wants to teach
how peoples of common heritage elaborate the inherited legal notions for
themselves, how one people receives institutions from another one and
modifies them according to its own views, and finally how legal systems of
different nations evolve even without any factual interconnection accord-
ing to the common laws of evolution. It searches, in a nut-shell, within the
systems of law, the idea of law."23
17. Eduard Gans, Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwickclung: Eine Abhandlung
der Universalrechtsgeschichte (1824) at p.XXXIX. See within the same—Hegelian—
paradigm Joseph Unger, Die Ehe in ihrer welthistorischen Entwicklung: Ein Bcitrag lur
Philosophic der Ceschichle (1850). Translation, here and in following references to German
sources by Anne Peters.
18. Joseph Kohler, Einleilung in die vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1885).
19. Wolfgang Gast, "Historischer Optimismus: Die juristische Weltsicht Josef Kohlers",
Zeitschrift filr vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 85 (1985) 1.
20. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, (1848) Book HI, Chap. XVII, §5.
21. The famous German political economist Wilhelm Roscher published in 1892 a book
called "Politik: Geschichtliche Naturlehre der Monarchic, Aristokratie und Demokratie".
He considered three typical forms of government as three stages of evolution of political life,
which until today and for all times shape government. The primary form of government is
the monarchy, followed by the aristocracy, then democracy, declining as a plutocracy, finally
the circle is completed by a new monarchy (caesarism) (pp.12-13). He deemed these forms
to be universal and "rooted in certain inexterminable human conditions" (p.8).
22. Erich Rothacker, "Die vergleichende Methode in den Geisteswissenschaften", (1957)
60 Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 13 at p.17.
23. Franz Bemhoft, "Ueber Zweck und Mittel der vergleichenden Rechtswissenschaft",
(1878) 1 Zeitschrift fllr vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 1 at pp.36-37.
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A related stream of comparative scholarship was the so-called compa-
rative anthropology (Rechtsethnologie).2* One of its founders, Albert
Hermann Post, assumed that "there are general forms of organisation
lying in human nature as such, which are not linked to specific peoples".
He sought to explain the causes of these generalities empirically, through
comparison.25 ' [F]rom the forms of the ethical and legal conscience of
mankind manifested in the customs of all peoples of the world, I seek to
find out what is good and just I take the legal customs of all peoples of
the earth as the manifestations of the living legal conscience of mankind
as a starting-point of my legal research and then ask, on this basis, what
the law is."26 So, despite their lost faith in natural law, scholars still
believed in a universal truth, hidden under historical and national
variations, which could be uncovered through legal comparison. As the
important German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey put it: "As historicism
rejected the deduction of general truths in the humanities by means of
abstract constructions, the comparative method became the only strategy
to reach general truths."27
In a way antagonistic to historicist universalism was the old theme of
the dependency of law on the local conditions, which had already been
brought to the fore by Montesquieu.28 A hundred years later, the
influential German historical school of law considered law to be the
product of the Volksgeist, and thus particular to every nation.29 Especially
the Romanist branch of this school, with its fixation on Roman law and on
24. Critics observe that the background of this type of research was colonialism and
imperialism, which needed comparative anthropology, not in order to leam from foreign
nations, but rather in order to justify the expansion of European interests across the globe.
25. "[CJomparative-ethnological research seeks to acquire knowledge of the causes of the
facts of the life of peoples by assembling identical or similar phenomena, wherever they
appear on earth and by drawing conclusions about identical or similar causes." Albert
Hermann Post, Bausteint fur tint allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend-ethno-
logischcr Basis (1880), Vorrede, citations at pp.12-13. Other important works of this school
are idem, Einleitung in das Sludium der ahnologischen Jurisprudent (1886); Henry Maine,
Ancient law, 3d ed. (1866).
26. Albert Hermann Post, Die Grundlagen des Rechts und die Grundztige seiner
Entwicklungsgeschichtc Leitgedanken fur den Aufbau einer allgemeinen Rechtswissenschaft
auf sociologischer Basis (1884) at p.XI.
27. Wilhelm Dilthey, "Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissen-
jchaften", in idem, Gesammelle Schriften, Vol. VII (4 ed. 1965) (orig. 1910) 77 at p.99.
28. Charles de Secondat Montesqieu, De I'Esprii des lots (1748), book I, chap. 3.
29. See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fUr Gesetigebung und
Rechtswissenschaft (1840), p.8: "Where we first find documented history, the civil law has
already a determinate character, peculiar to the people, just as have their language,
manners, constitution." Or elsewhere: "If we ask further for the subject in which and for
which positive law has its existence, we find this is the people. Positive law lives in the
common consciousness of the people, and we therefore have to call it people's law
(Volksrecht). ... [I]t is the spirit of the people (Volksgeist), living and working in all the
individuals together, which creates the positive law ..." (idem, System des heutigen
rdmischen Rechts, Vol. I (1840) at p.14).
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legal notions (Begriffsjurisprudenz), was ambivalent towards the compa-
rative study of living legal systems.30
Moreover, the rise of nationalism and legal positivism favoured
concentration of scholars on their own nations and on the printed legal
texts. This change of climate had a stunting effect on comparative legal
studies.31 In 1852, Rudolf von Ihering deplored the degradation of legal
science to "national jurisprudence", which he considered a "humiliating
and unworthy form of science". He called for comparative legal studies,
which would restore the discipline's "character of universality".32
3. Intra- and Transnational Unification
The universalist character of legal science reclaimed by Ihering was soon
brought about by industrialisation and the internationalisation of the
economy, the third promoter of universalism in comparative law.
Beginning already in the 1840s, technical and economic developments
had spurred extraordinary legislative activity in order to modernise the
State and regulate new fields. The drafting of the new codes was based on
extensive legislative comparison, undertaken or mandated by the legis-
lators themselves. These practical endeavours, together with the increase
of transnational economic activities, led to a new heyday of legal
comparison as a scholarly discipline in Europe, mostly related to technical
and commercial law.33 The predominant motives of legal comparison
appeared to be, first, stock-taking for national legislation and intra-
30. In retrospect, one of the pioneers of comparative law, Felix Meyer, said that in 1894,
mainstream scholarship "bemoaned [the comparative discipline] as dilettantism and as
Utopian project, looked pitifully down on it from the heights of Roman law as the beatific
ratio scripta." His address is reproduced in Karl von Lewinski, "Die Feier des zwanzig-
jShrigen Besteheru der Intemationalen Vereinigung fUr vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft
und Volkswirtschaftslehre", 9 (1914) Blatter filr vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und
Volkswiruchaftslehre Suppl. to issue 9,2-3. Sec on the relationship of the historical school to
comparative law Slolleis supra n. 14 at p.24; Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, Introduction to
Comparative Law—The Framework (1969), (Tony Weir, trans., 3d ed. 1998) at $4 I; Elmar
Wadle, Einhundert Jahre Rechtsvergleichende Gesellschaften in Deutschland (1994) at p.17.
31. Walther Hug, "The History of Comparative Law", 45 (1931/1932) Harv. IntlLR. 1027
at p.1069-7; Zweigert & KOtz supra nJO at }4 III 3; Stolleis supra n.14 at pp.12, 24.
32. Rudolph von Ihering, Der Ceist des ROmischen Rechts aufden verschiedenen Stufen
seiner Entwicklung, Vol. 1, 9th ed. (1955) (1st ed. 1852) at p.15. Ihering's complaint was
justified to the extent that German lawyers in particular were preoccupied with their own
country, because German unification was, to say the least, one of the most pressing subjects
of the time. But this did not quite do justice to the discipline as a whole.
33. See for the comparatist mood Felix Meyer, speaking in 1914: "... today, when the'
internationalisation of the law has made enormous progress, when no Act is passed without
legal comparison and the global economic tendency is manifest in ever newly emerging
societies and institutes" (Lewinski lupra n.30 at p.3). Seminal works were Josef Kohler,
Deuuches Patenlrechl, Systematisch bearbeitet unter vergleichender Berilcksichtigung des
franzOsischen Patentrechts (1878); idem (ed.). Das Rechi des Markenschutzes mil Berilck-
sichtigung ausUndischer Cesetzgebungen und mit besonderer RUcksicht auf die englische,
anglo-amerikanische, franzdsische, belgische und italienische Jurisprudenz (1884/85).
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national harmonisation, and later, when codification was basically
completed in most European countries, international harmonisation. At
the first international conference on comparative law, the famous Paris
Congress of 1900, the French comparatist Raymond Saleilles described
the object of comparative law as the discovery of concepts and principles
common to all "civilised" systems of law, that is to say universal concepts
and principles which constitute a relatively ideal law: "[L]e droit compare
n'est que I'iddal relatif resultant de la comparaison des legislations".34 The
same seminal Congress established the principle that the ultimate goal of
any legal comparison should be legal unification.15 And at the 20th
anniversary of the German "International Association for Comparative
Law and National Economics", celebrated at the eve of World War I in
Berlin, its founder, Felix Meyer, repeated that the association, remaining
"true to the principle 'Through legal comparison towards legal unifi-
cation', seeks to develop and harmonise the law".36 Unification as the
necessary consequence of legal comparison and as its ultimate
accomplishment clearly reflected the broad universalising hopes of the
early comparatists.37
In addition, the plans for unification, mostly in the field of private law,
mirrored the general legal methods of the time in their favourable
attitude towards grand projects of systematisation. One hidden promoter
of that trend was probably the German Begriffsjurisprudenz,36 with an
approach which placed high emphasis on definitions and classifications to
create a systematic, stringent body of positive law. Although Begriffs-
jurisprudenz and legal positivism generally tended to disdain compara-
tive legal studies,39 comparatists themselves were arguably influenced by
34. Raymond Saleilles, "Conception et objet de la science juridique du droit compart" in
Procis verbaux et documents du Congris international de droit compart 1900. (1905-1907)
Vol. I, 167 at p.173. He continues: "Le droit compare cherche a difinir le type id£al tout
relatif qui se d£gage de la comparaison des legislations, de leur fonctionnement et de leurs
requitals".
35. See Pan. J. Zepos, "Die Bewegung zur Rechtsvereinheitlichung und das Schicksal der
geltenden ZivilgesetzbQcher", (1966) 19 Revue htllenique de droit international 14 at
pp.17-18.
36. Lewinski supra n.30 at p.3. Karl von Lewinski concluded his report on the celebration
with the words: "May we succeed jointly to contribute continuously to our part of the proud
edifice of science that links nations, in which in the future all nations shall reside peacefully
next to each other." {idem, at p.9).
37. "The spirit of universalism, which was perceptible already before, but especially in the
last century, is the foundation of all ideas of a unification of the law" (Zepos supra n.35 at
p.16).
38. Georg Friedrich Puchta, Cursus der Jnstitutionen, Vol. I (1841), esp. pp.95-108;
Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (3 volumes), 7th ed. (1891) (1st ed.
1862), esp. Vol. I, }24 (pp.59-60); Rudolph von Iheringsupra n.32, with the notorious phrase
at p.40: "Notions are productive, they mate and generate new ones".
39. See Ernst Rudolf Bierling.^uris/iic/ie Prinzipienlehre, Vol. I (1894, repr. 1961) at pJ3
(expecting "little or no use" of comparative law).
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this approach, and became eager to classify and categorise, concentrating
on formal rules, institutions, and procedures, and ignoring the rules' full
social and economic context.40 On the other hand, the new wave of
comparative law was in line with jurisprudential trends that were
emerging as a counter-reaction to legal positivism in all forms, such as
Zweckjurisprudenz*1 Interessenjurisprudenz,"1 precursors of legal
realism,43 and sociological jurisprudence.44 These new approaches were,
inter alia, seed-beds of functionalism in comparative law.
4. Functionalism
The functional approach may be considered as the fourth strand of
(implicit) universalism in comparative scholarship. It was suggested in the
1920s in order to overcome previous formalism.45 The novelty of the
functional approach was that comparative analysis now set off from a
concrete social problem. In other words, the starting point is not
considered the law, or the structure of legal institutions, but the facts.46
The founder of functionalism, Ernst Rabel, described as a common
denominator for every comparison "the social purpose of the rules and
the service of the concepts to this purpose. This is now aptly called the
functional approach."47 Functionalists consciously broke with the goals
and methods of the nineteenth century scholars. They disqualified
traditional comparative law as a mere "synoptic description of legal rules
and institutions".48 They eschewed rigid adherence to any taxonomy of
legal systems and arid classifications, although in real research, the old
classification schemes still played a role. The functionalist program, as
formulated by Max Rheinstein, is that comparative law must "go beyond
the taxonomic or analytical description or technical application of one or
more systems of positive law [E] very rule and institution has to justify
its existence under two inquiries: First, What function does it serve in
40. Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Laws (1987) at pp.3-4.
41. Rudolph von Ihering, Der Zweck im Rechl, 2 Vols. (1877).
42. Philipp Heck, "Gcsetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz", (1914) 112 Archiv
far die dvilistische Praxis 1-318.
43. Oliver Wendell Holmei, Jr., The Common Law (1881) at p.l: "The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." Idem, "The Path of the Law", (1897) 10 Harv. Intl
LR. 457^*78.
44. Roscoe Pound, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence", (1911) 24
Harv. Intl LR. 591-619; (1911/12)25 Harv. Intl LR. 140-168,489-516.
45. Ernst Rabel, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung (1925) at p.4.
46. See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, EinfUhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung. 2nd ed. (1987) at
p.33.
47. Ernst Rabel, "Some Major Problems of Applied Comparative Law, especially in the
Conflict of Law (summary)", in Association of American Law Schools (ed.) Summarized
Proceedings of the Institute in the Teaching of International and Comparative Law (1948) at
p. l l l .
48. Max Rheinstein, "Teaching Comparative Law",(1938) 5 U.ChLLRev. 615 at p.618.
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present society? Second: Does it serve this function well or would another
rule serve better?"49 W. J. Kamba put the guiding question like this:
"[W]hat legal norms, concepts or institutions in one system perform the
equivalent functions performed by certain legal norms, concepts or
institutions of another system?"30 The functional approach spread from
Europe to the United States (where the leading post World War II
comparatists were e'migre's from Europe) and has dominated compara-
tive legal studies until today.31
The more recent comparative law and economics approach52 may be
regarded as a narrowed and specified version of functionalism, looking
not broadly at social functions, but exclusively at one particular function,
namely the rule's or institution's efficiency, in purely economic terms.
Today, quite a few comparatists are openly universalists, either
through their description of the laws or by suggesting how a uniform legal
order ought to be.53 The best-known descriptive version is probably
Rudolf Schlesinger's common-core-theory, according to which "—even
in the absence of organised unification efforts—there exists a common
core of legal concepts and precepts shared by some, or even by a
multitude, of the world's legal system."54
Besides, there is a concealed universalism inherent to the functionalist
approach. It applies objectivity and universality of the law, because it
rests on the assumption that "the legal system of every society faces
essentially the same problems, and solves these problems by quite
49. Idem at pp.617-618.
50. W. J. Kamba, "Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework", (1974) 231.GL.Q. 485
at p.517.
51. See Zweigert & Kotz supra n30 at pp32-47.
52. Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (1997).
53. See only Ren< David & John E. C Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today.
3d ed. (1985) at pp.4-6. For Myres McDougal, the goal of legal unification is to expand a
democratic world order "Most broadly conceived, that central, overriding purpose [of
comparative law] is ... the clarification for all our communities—from local through
national and regional to global—of the perspectives, the conditions, and the alternatives
that are today necessary for securing, maintaining, and enhancing basis democratic values in
a peaceful world." (Myres S. McDougal, "The Comparative Study of Law for Policy
Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World OTder", in William
Elliot Butler (Ed.) International Law in Comparative Perspective (1980) 191 at p.196).
Kaiser speaks of framing a "general theory of democratic-liberal constitutional law". Joseph
H. Kaiser, "Vergleichung im offentlichen Recht", (1964) 24 Zeitschrift filr auslSndisches
Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 391 at p399. Zweigert & Kotz supra n30 at $4 I, admit
that comparative legal studies with the objective of finding better solutions have an affinity
to natural law speculations.
54. "At least in terms of actual results—as distinguished from the semantics used in
reaching and stating such results—the areas of agreement among legal systems are larger
than those of disagreement." "[Tjhe existence and vast extent of this common core of legal
systems cannot be doubted." Rudolf B. Schlesinger/Hans W. Baade/Mirjan R. Damaska/
Peter E. Herzog, Comparative Law: Cases—Text—Materials. 5th ed. (1988) at pp.34-35,39.
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different means though very often with similar results."55 The underlying
theory is that law is an answer to the needs of society and a body of
"specialized instruments of social control".36
As a matter of fact, regional integration and globalisation are nowadays
levelling economic, political and moral standards, as well as lifestyles in
different countries. On the before-mentioned premise that legal rules
primarily react to social needs, they must naturally converge as well.
National characteristics of legal rules will gradually disappear with the
emergence of a global society, the theory runs.57 So trie strict socio-
functional view of the law almost inevitably leads to a theory of the
gradual convergence of legal systems.58 The question is, however,
whether or not natural convergence is merely a euphemism for North-
American, and to a lesser extent, European "legal imperialism".59
55. Zweigert & KOtz supra n.30 at p.34; but see much more cautiously Hein KOtz,
"Abschicd von der Rcchtslcreislehre?", (1998) 6 Zeitschrift far europUisches Privatrecht
493-505 at pp.504-505 (limited value of the functional approach). Critically Frankenberg
(1985) supra n.4 at p.436: "The functional approach runs the risk of simplifying complex
reality by assuming that similarity of problems produces similarity of results."
56. Roscoe Pound, "Comparative Law in Space and Time", (1955) 4 AmJ.Comp.L 70 at
p.72; similarly Rheinstein (1938) supra n.44 at p.619.
57. See, e.g., Michael King, "Comparing Legal Cultures in the Quest for Law's Identity",
in David Nelken (Ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures (1997) 119 at p.132.
58. Vincenzo Ferrari, "Socio-legal Concepts and Their Comparison", in Else Ocyen (Ed.)
Comparative Methodology (1990) 63 at p.69; Basil Markesinis (Ed.), The Gradual
Convergence: Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences, and English Law on the Eve of the 21st
Century (1994); Peter De Cruz. Comparative Law in a Changing World (1995) at pp.
477-489; Reinhard Zimmermann, "'Common law' und 'civil law', Amerika und Europa—
zu diesem Band," in Reinhard Zimmermann (Ed.), Amerikanische Rechtskultur und
europaisches Privatrecht (1995) 1 at p.2; K6tz supra n5S at pp.497-504. The critical
perspective on this issue is represented by Pierre Legrand, "European Systems are not
Converging", (1996) 45 I.C.L.Q. 52-81 (arguing that common and civil law systems are
irreducibly different).
59. Arthur T. von Mehren, "An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law?", (1971) 19
AmJ.Comp.L 624 at p.625; see also Rolf Knieper, "Rechtsimperialismus?", (1996) 29
Zeitschrift far Rechtspolitik 64-67 (recommending inter-regional harmonisation and
reliance on local traditions in post-communist societies); critical towards the "ideology of
convergence" also Hill supra n.3 at p.110.
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II. POST-MODERNIST OBJECTIONS AGAINST COMPARATIVE LAW AND
THEIR FLAWS
/. Legal Comparison: Trapped in Irreconcilable Frameworks?
a) Cultural Framework-Relativism
Post-modernists assert that traditional comparisons are only a pretence of
empiricism, only a projection of the scholar's own imagination.60 This is so
because there is no external stand-point from which to describe, compare,
and assess legal solutions.61 Comparatists "need to accept that the others
have different truths".62
The base-line and key assumption of this criticism is what we have
called the framework-theory. The framework-theory holds that there is
no common denominator that guarantees the possibility of neutral and
objective meaning and value. No autonomous world of meaning and
values exists, but all systems are self-contained, self-referential and
relative. Therefore, legal thought, language, and judgement are deter-
mined by inescapable epistemic, linguistic, cultural and moral frame-
works.63 Frameworks are institutionalised so that comparatists are
dominated "by a grid of concepts, research techniques, professional
ethics, and politics, by which the prevailing culture imposes on the
individual scholar its canons of how legal scholarship is to be
conducted."64
Because of the belief in insurmountable frameworks, the post-modern
approach naturally focuses on the "problems of perspective as a central
and determinative element in the discourse of comparative law".63
60. David Kennedy thinks of international law "as establishing itself through an ongoing
process of imagination, creating doctrines and institutions as efforts to transcend and bridge
what it imagines as differences in a world of cultures it seeks to hold at arm's length ...
comparative law shares this imaginative construction from the other side, seeing itself... as
an intellectual project of understanding between cultures whose similarities and differences
are foregrounded." Kennedy supra n.l at p.554. •
61. "[T]he comparativist must relinquish the comfortable position of the outside
observer if the Other is internally split and decisively inflected by the West (and vice versa),
then there is no wholly neutral position in which the comparativist can stand." Berman supra
n.4 at p.282 (emphasis added).
62. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.91; see in that sense also PieiTe Legrand, "Sur
1'analyse differcntielle des juriscultures", (1999) 51 Revue intemationale de droit compart
1053 at p.1062.
63. One of the seminal contributions was Francois Lyotard's La condition postmodeme:
Rapport sur te savoir (1979). Lyotard identifies as characteristics of the post-modern era the
obsoleteness of meta-narratives, which were in modern times used to legitimise institutions,
social and political practices, ethics and modes of thought. From the obsoleteness of
meta-narratives results the irresolvable incommensurability of language games, which make
consensual notions of truth and justice impossible.
64. Frankenberg (1997) supra n.3 at p.270. Note that by saying that the scholar needs "a
deconstructive move— ... breaking down the conceptual repression", the critic himself
seems—in somewhat contradictory terms—to imply that this is possible.
65. Frankenberg (1985) supra n.4 at p.411 (emphasis added).
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Correspondingly, the new "immersion approach implies a multiplicity of
standards, each true in its own legal culture."66
Most other new themes relate to the framework-theory: because there
is no escape from one's framework, all that can be done is to deconstruct
the ambiguities and indeterminacies within the dominant discourse,
including the internal contradictions and assumptions about the character
of foreign law.67 Similarly, the post-modern aversion to naive interpret-
ation of foreign texts has to do with that key-assumption. Interpretation
should first of all, in this view, seek to detect hidden purposes, meanings,
themes in familiar and foreign texts: in short, uncover the respective
framework. Because of the importance ascribed to frameworks, the focus
of interest shifts from the laws to be compared to the history, epistem-
ology and politics of comparative research itself,68 always on the watch for
tacit assumptions: "We must change the project of comparative law from
a naive epistemological project ('how best can we truly understand the
Other'?) to a critical and interventionist project ('what critical resources
exist both within one's "own" frame of reference and within the
"Other's" that can be deployed for emancipatory purposes?')".69
Under the premise that diverging, irreconcilable, cultural frameworks
make legal transplants futile, one considers that comparisons are less a
practical tool of law reform or legal harmonisation, but either art for art's
sake or overt and self-consciously "political projects of critique"70—both
seemingly antagonist types of post-modernist comparative endeavours
sharing an atechnical, explicitly subjective drive.
The foregoing paragraphs have, hopefully, underscored and illustrated
that the premise of the irreconcilable framework is the very bedrock of
the post-modernist approach to comparative law: "The full meaning of
laws can be understood only by viewing laws through the prism of the
intellectual framework in which they exist."71 Note that the gist lies not in
the hardly deniable proposition that throughout history and geography
we have a plurality of epistemic, normative, and cultural frameworks. The
problem lies in the assertion that these frameworks are incommensurable,
and this assertion will be discussed here.
66. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.64.
67. Cf. Riles supra n.8 at p.248.
68. See as an example Jorge L. Esquirol, "The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I),"
(1997) Utah L Rev. 425, analysing Rend David's comparative work on Latin American Law.
69. Berman supra n.4 at p.281. See also GUnter Frankenberg (1997) supra n.3.
70. Kennedy supra n.l at p.633. See also, idem at p.632, and generally pp.6O6-637 on the
"Politics" and Governance Projects of Comparative Law.
71. Catherine Rogers, "Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or The Conundrum of Comparative
Law", (1998) 67 George Washington LRev. 149 at pp.161-162. Sec also Grosswald Curran
supra n.6 at p.67 on "underlying, sometimes irreconcilable, differences among legal
systems"; also Legrand (1999) supra n.62 at p.1056.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300064666
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. WWZ Bibliothek, on 16 Aug 2017 at 14:00:17, subject to the Cambridge Core
OCTOBER 2000] Comparative Law beyond Post-modernism 813
b) Refutation
The post-modernist claim that comparative studies are basically a
projection, an outgrowth of our specific cultural framework, a futile
attempt to compare the incomparable, implies a type of relativism which
we shall call framework-relativism. We are aware that quite a few of the
critics explicitly try not to fall into relativism, while still holding on to the
dogma of the inescapable framework.72 However, the assertion that there
is some "in-between space" represents an attempt to wash the fur without
wetting it. We will therefore refute cultural framework-relativism and
thereby hit the hard core of the post-modernist critique.
Relativism Defined
Relativism is the position that neither universal knowledge exists
(epistemic relativism), nor universally valid norms (moral relativism),
because insights and values always depend on the standpoint of the
epistemic or moral subject. Epistemic relativism is concerned with the
relativity of the existence of facts, while moral relativism relates to the
relativity of the validity of values.73 Framework-relativism may refer
both to epistemics and to morals and is the assertion that all thinking
and/or judging takes place within insurmountable frameworks.74 The
framework-relativism underlying the post-modern critique of traditional
72. See, e.g., Brenda Crossman, "Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law,
Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project", (1997) Utah LRev. 525 at pp.526-527
and 537; Hartmut Rosa, "Lebensformen verglekhen und verstehen. Eine Theorie der
dimensionalen Kommensurabilitat von Kontexten und Kulturen", (1999) 1 Handlung,
Kullur, Interpretation: Zeitschrift fUr Sozial- und Kutturwissenschaften 10 at p24. With
regard to international law, David Kennedy likewise asserts that new approaches are on
their way to overcoming the "routine conflict between defenses of its overt accultural
posture and assertions of cultural relativism", (Kennedy supra n.l at p.569).
73. Our distinction of two basic type* of relativism presupposes a fact-value-distinction.
This runs counter to the post-modernist tendency, which denies that facts and morals are
two separable spheres. Not surprisingly, the post-modernist conflation of facts and morals
goes very well with the negation of the existence of truth: Theories do not aim at the truth,
but instead they seek to veil practical or moral attitudes, especially aspirations to power.
However, facts and norms are two distinct categories. Norms guide and improve the conduct
of humans, theories explain and predict, inter alia, the conduct of humans (Gerhard Schurz,
The h-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic (1997) at p.279). Normative
expressions can never replace ontologicaJ expressions salva veritate, and norms are not
derivable from facts, as Gerhard Schurz has recently explained in detail. There is no logical
bridge between norms and facts (idem, especially at pp.278-285). We can therefore uphold
the distinction between epistemic and moral relativism. This distinction does not preclude a
psychological interrelatedness in practice. Assumptions about what is "good" and "evil"
may psychologically influence what we hold to be true. For instance, we may be reluctant to
recognise our own personal properties that we find morally undesirable.
74. See in detail on framework-relativism infra pp.822-824.
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comparative law is a group-based relativism," more specifically a cultural
relativism, because the boundaries of the frameworks run along the
boundaries of cultures.
Objections against Cultural Relativism
We will first look at cultural relativism in general. It can be attacked
through a number of arguments, some of which are simple and forceful.
We will make two here.
In a cross-cultural discourse one cannot consistently hold that cultural
relativism is true not only for their own culture but also for other cultures:
Asserting that two persons from two cultures can never have commensur-
able theories and trying to convince a person from another culture of the
truth of cultural relativism at the same time is self-contradictory.
Another simple argument against cultural relativism is that cultures are
not hermetic, closed, immutable entities.76 Cultures, in contrast to
individuals, do not have readily determinable boundaries. And if
boundaries between cultures are blurry, the boundaries of the epistemic
and moral furniture of different cultures are blurry as well. Radical
difference or incommensurability cannot exist here. Examples of blurri-
ness and overlaps are easy to point out. Individuals can participate in
several cultures, for instance, simply by spending half of the year in
Norway and the other half in Spain. Also, there are those born into two
frameworks. Mass media and travelling spread elements of specific
cultures around the globe. It is well-known that the U.S.-American
culture has been and is continuing to infiltrate many other cultures of the
world. Also, differences within one culture may be greater than differ-
ences between cultures. Within a formation which is perceived as one
culture, there may be a dissent even about central elements of this culture.
For instance, some may consider the culture of the New World as
necessarily hybrid. Within "one" culture, we may find sub-cultures (for
example, a youth-culture). Some of these sub-cultures, such as the various
sub-cultures of scientists around the globe, may have more in common
with each other than with other members of their national culture. For
instance, the attitudes, interests, and style of living of a German
entomologist probably resembles more that of a Canadian entomologist
than those of a German blue-collar worker.
75. Historically, philosophers mostly thought of relativism (epistemic or moral) as
individually-based, at a relativism of the "I" (beginning in Western philosophy with the
sophists). Today, it is virtually always a group-based relativism that is discussed. In the
"I"-relativism, all insights and values are valid only for one person, in group-based
relativism they are shared by the members of a group, e.g., a culture.
76. See Elmar Holenstein, MenschlichesSelbstverstHndnis, Ichbewufltsein, Intcrsubjcktive
Verantwortung, Interkulturdlc VerstOndigung (1985) at pp.104-180.
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The haziness of boundaries becomes most apparent as soon as we look
at a culture through time. Is the culture of Germany still the same as it was
500 years ago? At which point do we have to recognise a different
culture? In any case, an average contemporary German would most likely
have less problems to get around, make his living, participate in
leisure-time activities in the Great Britain or Sweden of our days than in
Germany of 500 years ago.77
With regard to the relevance of cultural relativism for comparative law,
one should note that a single legal system can comprise various cultures
(think of the EU legal system) or one culture different legal systems
(think of Germany in the middle of the 19th century).
Objections against Cultural Framework-Relativism
Having made these two arguments against cultural relativism in general,
we shall now turn to cultural relativism in the form of framework-
relativism. Karl Popper defines framework-relativism as "the doctrine
that truth is relative to our intellectual background, which is supposed to
determine somehow the framework within which we are able to think:
that truth may change from one framework to another".78 Popper
maintains that behind this practice of operating in frameworks, which he
calls "myth of the framework", lurks the occidental dogmatic fundamen-
talism, the old axiomatic-deductive mode of reasoning, in which prin-
ciples or axioms cannot be questioned and determine all further
77. See also Thierry Lenain, "Understanding the Past: History as an Intercultural
Process", in Notker Schneider, Ram A. Mall & Dieter Lohmar (Eds.), Einheit und Vielfalt:
Das Ventehen der Kulturen (1998), 145-154, esp. at p.145: "But this concept [of
interculturality] can and should be extended to the question of historicity, for when we face
past periods of our own culture on a critical mode, we are dealing with cultural systems
which prove as different from ours as any present-day 'exotic' culture would be."
78. Popper 1994 supra n.12 at p.33. In fact, Popper identifies relativism in general with
framework-relativism. This is not correct, because relativism can also have a non-cognitive
foundation, i.e. must not be due to a special mode of thinking (e.g. axiomatic thinking), but
may for instance be due to psychological states.
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thought.79 This axiomatic-deductive structure of the frameworks is the
reason why they are insurmountable: if principles can never be
questioned on the basis of new experience, but—on the contrary—any
experience must be interpreted in the light of the principles (the
theory-loadedness of observation), then we are never capable of achiev-
ing new knowledge or accept new values which contradict our own
principles.80
Of course, such an axiomatic deductivism is conceivable, we say, but
the question is whether it is an appropriate model for real human
thinking. Our argument against it, and thereby against framework-
relativism, is that it contradicts the indispensable and not really contest-
able everyday-life view that one can—as every child does—experience
something fundamentally and surprisingly new. The concept of the closed
framework represents a kind of solipsism or subjective idealism, in which
reality does not play any role. Such a theory which does not allow the
acquisition of genuinely new knowledge is not acceptable, even if we still
have no generally acknowledged philosophical answer to the question of
how knowledge is obtained. Such an answer would surely have to make
the point that people do not only reason from the top down (deductively),
but also from the bottom up (inductively) and are capable of modifying
their principles due to new experiences. And we think that, in particular,
79. Idem at pp.59-60: "The myth of the framework is clearly the same as the doctrine that
one cannot rationally discuss anything that is fundamental, or that a rational discussion of
principles is impossible. This doctrine is, logically, an outcome of the mistaken view that all
rational discussion must start from some principles or, as they are often called, axioms,
which in their turn must be accepted dogmatically if we wish to avoid an infinite regress—a
regress due to the alleged fact that when rationally discussing the validity of our principles or
axioms we must again appeal to principles or axioms. Usually those who have seen this
situation either insist dogmatically upon the truth of a framework of principles or axioms, or
they become relativists; they say that there are different frameworks and that there is no
rational discussion between them, and thus no rational choice. But all this is mistaken. For
behind it there is the tacit assumption that a rational discussion must have the character of a
justification, or of a proof, or of a demonstration, or of a logical derivation from admitted
premises. But the kind of discussion which is going on in the natural sciences might have
taught our philosophers that there is also another kind of rational discussion: a critical
discussion which does not seek to prove or justify or establish a theory, least of all by
deriving it from some higher premises, but which tries to test the theory under discussion by
finding out whether its logical consequences are all acceptable, or whether it has, perhaps,
some undesirable consequences."
80. The theory of the theory-loadedness of observation is contradicted by evidence of
theory-resistance of observation in the psychology of perception. For instance, even if we
know that the moon at the horizon is not bigger than the moon at its zenith we still perceive it
as bigger. Moreover, this theory often goes together with a false notion of science, namely
that the theories on the functioning of an experimental apparatus and the side-conditions of
an experiment are so closely connected to the theories which are tested by that experiment,
that there results an inescapable circle. Normally, however, both theories are miles apart.
This is very obvious in biology and medicine. The experimental apparatuses are built on the
basis of physics and computer science, but the theories tested in the experiments are
biological, and no one would say that the results of biological research were determined by
physics or computer science.
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little children do this on a daily basis, and are constantly inventing new
principles and categories. We don't see why mentally flexible adults
shouldn't be able to do the same.
A glance at the intellectual sources of framework-relativism reveals
that it—inter alia—relies on a partial reading of Thomas Kuhn81 and on
some sloppy scholarship of Benjamin Whorf. The framework-theory
holds that there is no real communication among people arguing on the
basis of incommensurable frameworks. And where there is no communi-
cation, no rational assessment of the position of the Other can be made.
Precisely this was the conclusion drawn by many philosophers from
Thomas Kuhn's seminal essay "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"
of 1962. However, Kuhn explicitly rejected this reading of his work in the
1969 postscript to the second edition. Kuhn thought that paradigms (i.e.
frameworks in our sense) are able to be transgressed and that the
problems of translation between paradigms can be resolved in principle.82
The belief that categories contained in language constitute an insur-
mountable framework is inspired by linguist relativism. Generally,
linguistics plays a big role in post-modernist thought. A key post-
modernist assumption is that all human systems operate like language
and that there is nothing prior to language.83 Law (like language) is
viewed as a complex, coded system of signs, which is powerful but finite
and which constructs and maintains meaning and value. Consequently,
the chosen complementary science of post-modern legal comparison is no
longer (as for the traditionalists) social science, but rather literary
theory.84 The most prominent protagonist of linguist relativism in the 20th
century has been Benjamin Whorf. Whorf told us about the language of
the Hopi Indians, a Native American tribe in Arizona: "After long and
careful study and analysis, the Hopi language is seen to contain no words,
grammatical forms, constructions or expressions that refer directly to
what we call 'time', or to past, present and future, or to enduring or lasting
... [T]he Hopi language contains no reference to 'time', either explicit or
implicit".83 Whorf s conclusion was that the Hopi lived in a universe
totally different from ours, because they lacked the concept of time. The
81. See, e.g., references to Kuhn in Ainsworth supra n.10 at p.30; or in Rosa supra n.72 at
pp. 12-17.
82. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (3rd Ed. 1996) at pp.198-204.
83. Ermarth supra n.ll at p.588.
84. A paradigmatic example is Mitchel de S.-O.I'E. Lasser, "Comparative Law and
Comparative Literature: A Project in Progress", (1997) Utah LRev. 472-524, constructing
and deploying a "'literary theory' methodology in order to analyze the complex
significations produced by the French and American judicial discourses" (idem, at p.471);
see also the extensive footnote in Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at pp.49 n.12 and 54-59
("Comparative Law as a Phenomenon of Translation").
85. Benjamin Lee Whorf, "An American Indian Model of the Universe", Manuscript
approx. 1936, in John B. Carroll (Ed.) Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) 57, at pp.57-58.
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Whorf theory received widespread attention. Less known is Ekkehart
Malotki's meticulous study of the Hopi language, which unearthed a lot of
words, grammatical forms, constructions and expressions referring to
time, as indicated in the following translation of a Hopi utterance: "Then
indeed, the following day, quite early in the morning at the hour when
people pray to the sun, around that time he woke up the girl again."86
Here we are tempted to ask: couldn't this classic case of scientific error
have occurred in comparative law as well? It teaches us that seemingly
incommensurable differences may be merely a scientific artefact due to
lack of a more complete knowledge and understanding of a foreign legal
order and its culture.
Objections against Moral Relativism
Up to now, we have spoken of knowledge and values together, but have
concentrated on epistemic relativism. We now want to discuss moral
relativism in particular. According to moral relativism, principles of
justice, fairness or equity are merely a function of moral practices, which
in turn are entirely contingent (for example to culture, history or society).
Any type of morality is as justified as any other. Therefore no external
standard of justice can be applied to a given legal instrument. It is
impossible to pass a judgment on the morality of legal practices of others
who have adopted moralities different from one's own.87
Culture-based moderate moral relativism appears to be an appropriate
attitude vis-d-vis our pluralist, divided, multi-cultural world. But its strict
version is not viable. The simplest reason is the one already mentioned,
that cultures have no clear boundaries. Another argument against moral
relativism is its tendency to contradict itself. A world-wide discourse on
moral relativism is perhaps not a contradiction in and of itself,88 as a
discourse on epistemic relativism is. One can, however, quickly entangle
oneself in contradictions, namely if one sets up rules for that discourse
and does not allow participants to act in a manner which is unfair,
86. Ekkehart Malotki, Hopi Field Notes (1980), quoted in idem, Hopi lime: A Linguistic
Analysis of the Temporal Aspects in the Hopi Language (1983) at p.vi.
87. Interestingly enough, moral relativism is often defended in a philosophical camp
which otherwise contrasts with post-modernism in most respects, the communitarian one.
Communitarians emphasise that moral intuitions, capacities and reactions are created and
determined through upbringing and education in concrete communities. See in particular
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (1984); also Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 1989,
Chapter 1, entitled "Inescapable Frameworks", pp.3-24.
88. But see Karl-Otto Apel, Transformation der Philosophic VoL II: Das Apriori der
Kommunikationsgcmcinschaft (1973), esp. 400, 420-425; JQrgen Habermas, "Diskur-
sethik—Notizen zu einem Begrflndungsprogramm", in idem, Moralbewufitsein und kom-
munikatives Handeln (1983), 53, at p.105; Jiirgen Habermas, "ErlSuterungen zur
Diskursethik", in idem, Erl&uterungen lur Diskursethik, 2nd ed. (1992), 119, at p.195 for the
assertion that engaging in a discourse necessarily implies recognition of some universal
norms.
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libellous, insulting, plagiarious etc. Thereby one asks for some universal
set of moral rules and thereby contradicts the relativist stance.
In practice, culture-based moral relativism pays a high price, because it
can be made the handmaiden of dictators and stabs human rights
activitists in the back. Most people assume that some basic human rights
apply in the whole world, and dictators increasingly show a bad
conscience if they violate them. In defence they can, however, make use
of moral relativisms and have often done this, by asserting that certain
values are culture-bound values, for example western values, which do
not apply in their own culture. Dissidents and human rights proponents in
the respective countries have always protested and pointed to the
hypocrisy of this reasoning.89 Here, post-modernism finds itself in the
embarrassing role of an intellectual assistant to dictators.
Put the other way round, moral relativism, strictly applied, would
forbid all intercultural argument or action against totalitarian and
inhuman ideologies. Everyone who is engaged, everyone who takes any
political action whatsoever, be it as a human rights activist or otherwise,
negates moral relativism through his very actions.90
But, if we reject moral relativism, does not the spectre of moral
absolutism arise? No. First of all, moral framework-relativism itself is a
moral absolutism, for it treats certain values within a given framework as
absolute and does not allow for escape. It seems to be less absolutist and
more realist to assume that people can make moral experiences which
force them to step out of the moral framework they are used to. On the
basis of that assumption, we suggest a strategy that tries to ascertain the
validity of norms empirically with a view to actual moral attitudes of
people. We expect to find some basic attitudes to be very similar in almost
all people. But this finding would not be a moral absolutism based on a
priori reasoning, but a moral ex post universalism based on empirical
data.
Moreover, ultimate moral decisions are not needed in comparative law,
because a comparatist normally asks meta-questions on moral issues,
which in turn belong to the epistemic, not moral sphere: to determine
whether a specific legal tool is fair according to the standards of its own
legal culture (or any other standard applied by the scholar) is no moral
statement, instead it is an epistemic one which may be true or false.
Comparative law is, therefore, ultimately independent of the question of
whether or not moral relativism is true.
89. See, e.g., LungJingtai, "Wo Respckt zu GleichgUltigkeit wird", (1998) No. 78,2 April,
Frankfurter A llgemeine Zeitung 39.
90. See for further arguments against moral cultural relativism and for a "deliberative
universalism" Amy Gutmann, "The Challenge of Multiculturalism", (1993) 22 Political
Ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs 171-206.
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2. The Comparatist's Bias
a) The Post-modernist Argument
Post-modernists assert that even if we explicitly abstain from evaluating,
our whole investigation and presentation will be full of (unconscious)
judgements." We are unavoidably biased, so that any attempt at a neutral
description is an illusion, merely covering up our own—most Eurocentric
(or Western)—views: we are subject to "the unconscious spell that holds
us to see others by the measure of ourselves",92 we wear "lenses" that are
"superimposed on foreign legal systems" and "may cause severe misper-
ceptions and disclocations".93 "Comparatists cannot hope to perceive
beyond the limits of their perceptions, nor to divest themselves entirely of
the substructural categorisations of their own cultures of origin."94
Comparative law "is a project that is perhaps inherently ethnocentric—
there is no way to escape or transcend the ethnocentric gaze."95 In other
words, there is always a Vorversta'ndnis, which is creative or "(virtually)
always and already normative", for "the context and legal unconscious
already perform normative work in selecting, establishing, and organizing
the so-called 'descriptive' categories deployed in legal thought."96
Bias is already inherent in the choice of what materials deserve
comparison (which includes the implicit, foundational comparison which
indicates whether the materials are sufficiently similar to be meaningfully
compared in depth) and is "almost always more or less arbitrary or
91. "The questions comparativists ask will reflect their own perceptual prisms and affect
their receptivity to data from observed legal cultures". Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.58.
"One of the dangers of comparative law is the temptation to mould the data with a view to
substantiating a preconceived thesis. This temptation is exacerbated by the fact that the
legal material which comparative research provides is extremely diverse and malleable."
Hill supra n.3 at p.107.
92. Frankcnberg (1985) supra n.4 at p.414.
93. Demleitncr supra n.9 at p.654; Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at pp.48-49 (distortion
inevitably prevails in the comparative act).
94. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.58. The American legal anthropologist Rebecca
French reminds the comparatist of "all the practical and conceptual assumptions that
American lawyers already know about the world and about the law: the dimensions of space
and time, the subtleties of legal myth and narrative, the legal rituals that define how actors
act, speak, and move in a legal forum, social hierarchies that influence their decisions, the
aspects of authority, power and legitimation they understand. But what if most of or all of
these practical and conceptual assumptions were not only different from those that apply in
Tibet but arranged in networks or sets or relations that were also entirely different? What if,
when one first asked Tibetans about law, they said that no such category existed?" Rebecca
Redwood French, The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet (1995) at p .57.
French's marvellous book is a highly impressive attempt to understand a very different legal
culture.
95. Crossman supra n.72 at p.526.
96. Pierre Schlag, "Normativity and the Politics of Form", (1991) 139 U. Pennsylvania
L.R. 801 at pp.808 and 81Z
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one-sided, leaving quite a lot of room for permeation of subjectivism".97
"[T]he conceptual constructs that we use determine the way in which we
perceive the subject we are studying, and consequently the issues that we
imagine to be worth investigating".98
The Vorverstdndnis also determines the choice of the aspect under
which we compare. It is derived from observations in the comparatist's
own culture—so the critical stance—and then styled as an abstract tertium
comparationis. Because the tertium is basically a cultural projection,
comparison under that aspect becomes a "self-fulfilling prophecy".99
b) Refutation
The bias-argument feeds on the premise that there are closed frame-
works. The "unconscious spell", the "lenses", "the ethnocentric gaze" etc.
denote frameworks. We have rejected the premise of inescapable
frameworks and need not repeat ourselves here.
The bias-argument is self-defeating in at least two ways. First, in order
to raise the bias-reproach, post-modernist critique must be able to occupy
a position beyond the frameworks. Otherwise it could not recognise tie
bias. But transcending the framework is what the critique cannot do
according to its own theory. Secondly, in order to be consistent, it would
have to conceive of itself as bias and projection and self-fulfilling
prophecy of its own framework. This, however, would again be
self-defeating.
The popular reproach that the scientific community is western-
dominated and western-biased100 deserves special and explicit refutation.
Apart from the fact that boundaries between the West and the East or the
South are blurry,101 the argument can be used in all situations to devaluate
undesirable results. A consensus among comparatists can be questioned
on the ground that it exists among western scholars only. But if
non-western scientists agree, it can be suspected that their voices have
been, through education and power structures, westernised and not
authentic. We here have an argument ad personam (not ad hominem),m
which is banned in science. The western-bias argument can be used to
refute whatever hypothesis. Its critical potential is, therefore, zero.
97. Roman Tokarczyk, "Some Considerations on Comparative Law", (1990) 59 Revista
Jurldica Univenidad de Puerto Rico 951 at p.959.
98. Ainsworth supra n.10 at p.30; see also Legrand (1999) supra n.62 at pp.1054,1057-58.
99. Joachim Matthes, "The Operation Called 'Vergleichen'", in idem (Ed.), Zwischen den
Kulturen? Die Sozialwissenschaften vordem Problem da Kulturvergleichs (1982) 75 at p.83.
100. See, e.g., Frankenberg (1997) supra n.3 at p.263.
101. Supra pp.820-821.
102. See Chaim Perelman & Louise Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric- A Treatise on
Argumentation (1969) (John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver transl.) (orig. 1958) at
pp.111-112.
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The alternative to the bias-argument is an undogmatic case-by-case
critique, which allows for the possibility of non-biased research. Pro-
jections, unconscious judgements, self-fulfilling prophecies are possible
everywhere, but to assert that they are inevitable in comparative law is
merely unscientific, critique-immune dogmatism.
3. Comparative Law as a Hegemonial Project
a) The Post-modernist Argument
The view that knowledge and understanding is framework-dependent is
complemented by the post-modernist focus on power"" and the Other104:
Because there is no truth, there is also no search for truth, but only
ideology. So legal scholarship is, as law in general, basically an ideology, a
theoretical construct for the purpose of gaining, cementing, and justifying
the exercise of power,105 which means in particular domination and
discrimination of the Other. The entire process of comparative law is not
really a comparison of two realities, but an appropriation of the Other
according to the familiar standard,106 a "power-oriented nostrification of
the foreign".107 Hence, comparison proceeds along an imagined trajectory
of social or cultural "development" and is in this regard still influenced by
the after-effects of 19th century evolutionism.108
103. The power theme has been primarily developed by Michel Foucault. See as an
overview the interview with Foucault: "Wahrheit und Macht" (Truth and Power), in Michel
Foucault, Dispositive der Macht: Uber Sexualititl, Wissen und Wahrheit (1978) 21-74.
104. Cf. Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Rdponse a la question: Qu'est-ce que le postmoderne?,"
(1982) Vol. 37, No. 419 Critique: revue gintrale des publications francaises el ttrangires 357,
German transl.: "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist postmodern?," in Peter Engelmann
(Ed.), Postmodeme und Dtkonstruktion (1990) 33 at pp.48-49 on unrepresentability and
difference; Jean-Francois Lyotard, Un enjeu des uttes des femmes (1976), German
translation: "Ein Einsatz in den KHmpfen der Frauen", in idem, Das Patchwork der
Minderheiten (1977) 52-72. Consequently, the new vision of comparative law has its "focus
on difference" (Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.83).
105. See, e.g., Schlagsupra n.96 at pp.803-804. Human rights law is, in critical eyes, "not
based on innocent humanitarianism, timeless and universal Truth. Rather, is a situated,
contingent, and contested knowledge that is discursively produced by multiple dominating
and resistant discourses. In its current form, human rights law naturalises and legitimises the
subjugating and disciplinary effects of European, masculinist, heterosexual and capitalist
regimes of power." Dianne Otto, "Rethinking Universals: Opening Transformative
Possibilities in International Human Rights Law," (1997) 18 Austral. Yearbook Int'l L. 1 at
p.35.
No wonder that traditional comparatists are deemed to share a "status-quo orientation
and a fairly uncritical acceptance of the ideological foundations of the hegemonic legal
regimes". Frankenberg (1997) supra n.3 at p.266. Berman advises critical comparatists to
"refuse the homogenizing and essentializing gestures of the tradition: instead, show how all
cultural formations are split, hybrid, and embedded in contexts of power". (Berman supra
n.4atp.281).
106. Matthes supra n.99, at p.84.
107. Jflrgen Straub, Handlung, Interpretation, Kritik GrundzQge einer textwissenschaft-
lichen Handlungs- und Kulturpsychologie (1999) at p.6.
108. Matthes supra n.99 at pp.81-82.
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This leads to the claim that traditional comparative law is an ideological
project, obeying a secret (or unconscious) political agenda which is a
"hegemonic"109 one. The hegemonic reaction towards the Other is either
assimilation ("normalization") or exclusion ("exoticization"),110 both
alternatives ultimately seeking to perpetuate the supremacy of European
elites. Critical comparatists find that traditional comparatists will pursue
either one of these evil strategies.1" Traditional comparative activities are
"political interventions","2 "politics in the guise of comparative sci-
ence","3 and "an invasive political enterprise".l|j| Comparative legal
scholarship is not so much an intellectual enterprise as essentially an
"ideological project, developing lenses through which the center will
interpret the periphery,... developing the alternatives of assimilation and
exclusion for particular cultures while solidifying an ideological picture of
international governance 'above' cultural differences, either absorbing or
avoiding them.""3 Mainstreamers are, first, uncritical towards the legal
status quo in their country, and towards the ideological foundations of
Western legal systems: "[T]he comparative law agenda is largely con-
ditioned by an uncritical attitude towards fundamental issues of social
and economic organization.""6 Therefore, they "almost inevitably reach
conclusions which are conservative—in the sense of confirming and
consolidating existing preconceptions about law and society"."7 Sec-
ondly, mainstreamers are "partial to unity and standardisation under the
auspices of the very rule of law [they] like [...] best." Their vocabulary,
goals, method, and discursive practices betray a strong bias for the home
law. But they try "to suppress their subjectivity and hide their peculiar
perspective behind the rhetoric of objectivity and neutrality, while
109. See Frankenberg (1997)supra n.3 at p.263 on the mainstreamer as a "hegemonic self,
a representative of legal paternalism".
110. Berman supra n.4 at p.282.
111. See idem, passim; Kennedy supra n.l at p.618; Esquirol supra n.68 at p.470, on
comparatists' "fiction of Europeanness" of Latin American Law.
112. Frankenberg (1997) supra n.3 at p.261. See similarly Hill supra n J at pp.109-110 on
the pervasive influence of the political climate of the time on comparative scholarship.
113. Esquirol supra n.68 at p.437. Esquirol seeks to show that Ren£ David's descriptions
of Latin American law "are subordinate to a politico-theoretical project" (idem at p.438).
114. Frances Olsen, "The Drama of Comparative Law", (1997) Utah LRev. 275 at p.278.
"Comparativists should recognize the power relations involved" (idem).
115. Kennedy supra n.l at p.619. According to Kennedy, the comparatist's modest
posture as expert or erudite reinforces the internationalist's claim to govern for a space
beyond culture. By dividing the assimilable from the exotic, the comparatist stabilises the
boundaries between centre and periphery while reinforcing the claim that those boundaries
are matters of culture and history rather than political products of an ongoing international
regime. "The comparativist, in this sense, works as an ideologist for the global system of
government", idem at p.636.
116. Hill supra n.3 at p.106, also p.107.
117. "[TJhe comparative law agenda is largely conditioned by an uncritical attitude
towards fundamental issues of social and economic organization." Hill supra n.3 at p. 106.
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camouflaging their politics by pragmatism.""8 They have a "paternalistic
agenda", "a totalizing grasp of the subject matter" and work "to enhance
and spread the authority of Anglo/European law"."9 In short, they pursue
a "project of neocolonialism".120 The traditional methods and techniques
of comparison are, therefore, "strategic".121 They serve to justify and
confirm the superiority of western law and the necessity to intervene.122
Legal harmonisation is "part of a new interventionist political
scheme"123 as well, and the current rush for codification appears as a
"form of conquest executed through legal transplants and harmonization
strategies ... dictated by the European Community, the IMF, the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other supranational or
international agencies."124
Concentrating on "Power" and the "Other", critical analysis seeks to
uncover patterns of subjugation and discrimination in legal institutions.
Often, critical comparatists study legal cultures which have been or still
are dominated and marginalised, such as former colonies, developing
countries, or countries of the former socialist bloc, which in their eyes
undergo new forms of legal domination exercised by capitalist legal
consultants and market forces. Much critical comparative work centres
upon the dichotomy between dominant western law and non-western law.
b) Refutation
The hegemony-argument holds that comparatists do not care for truth,
but primarily for power. It also implies that we cannot distinguish true
from false statements. The hegemony-argument is thus based on epis-
temic relativism, whose viability we have already contested.
Moreover, the argument is self-defeating in a specific way: If there is no
truth, but only ideology to camouflage aspirations to power, then even the
post-modernist critique cannot claim to be true but can only consider
itself as an ideology to camouflage aspirations of power. Thereby it would
exclude itself from the scientific discourse.
Certainly comparative scholarship may be motivated by hegemonial
pretensions and may constitute a political intervention cloaked by
pseudo-scientific methods, but not inevitably. One must examine every
individual piece of scholarship to see whether it is so.
118. Frankenbcrg (1997) supra n.3 at p.263.
119. /rfe/n at pp.263-265.
120. Esquirol supra n.68 at p.437 on Ren< David's writing on Latin America.
121. Frankenbcrg (1985) supra n.4 at p.421.
122. Frankenbcrg (1997) supra n.3 at pp.265-266.
123. Idem at p.273.
124. Idem at p.262.
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4. Comparatist Categories and Classifications
a) The Post-modernist Argument
Under the premise that logic and science heavily depend on specific
epistemic frameworks with relative validity, all types of (scientific)
categories, taxonomies, and classifications are suspicious.123
A prominent illustration of this suspiciousness is Michel Foucault's
citation of a taxonomy from "a certain Chinese encyclopaedia", reported
by Jorge Louis Borges.126 In it, animals are regrouped as follows: a)
animals belonging to the emperor, b) embalmed ones, c) tamed ones, d)
sucking pigs, e) sirens, f) mythical ones, g) stray dogs, h) those included in
this classification, i) those acting as if mad, j) innumerable ones, k) those
drawn with a very fine brush of camel hair, 1) and so on, m) those having
just broken the flower vase, n) those looking like flies from far. This
strange and irritating order has, through Foucault, become a prime
example of non-western categorisation, by which Foucault apparently
wants to remind us of the relativity and cultural embeddedness of our
(western) modes of ordering things, laws, institutions.127
The mistrust of classifications is particularly relevant in comparative
law, which has traditionally counted classification (for example, in legal
families) to its tasks.128 The critique finds that current comparatist
classifications are merely "formalist ordering and labeling ... often
randomly gleened [sicl] from limited data".129 Classification is Euro-
American-centric, banning to a "residual category such as 'other',
'immature', 'primitive' ... 'developing', 'in transition'" all non-western
laws.110 Critical comparisons should, rather, unearth "substructural, often
unarticulated, categorisations" in order to "challenge silent assump-
tions".131 Ultimately, post-modernists are fond of calling into question the
category of law.132
125. See, e.g., Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.48.
126. Jorge Louis Borges, "Die analytische Sprache John Wilkins"' in idem, Das Eirte und
die Vielen: Essays zur Litcratur (1966) 209 at p.212 (first published in Hiswria de la eternidad,
1953).
127. Michel Foucault, Les mots et Its choses (1966) (p.17 of the German translation, Die
Ordnung der Dinge, 14th ed. 1997).
128. See for a moderate criticism of the doctrine of legal families KOtz supra n.55 at
pp.493-505; for a new taxonomy Ugo Mattei (1997) 45 AmJ.Comp.L. 5-44 (suggesting the
division of the world legal systems into the three families of the rule of professional law, the
rule of political law, and the rule of traditional law).
129. Frankenberg (1985) supra n.4 at p.421.
130. Frankenberg (1997) supra n.3 at p.267.
131. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.45.
132. See Grosswald Oman supra n.6 at p.59, whose "immersion approach" to compara-
tive law "suggests that law does not have a life of its own". See also French supra n.93 at
pp.xiii and 57.
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b) Discussion
The post-modernist claim that categories and classifications are culturally
contingent is a direct outgrowth of the theory of inescapable cultural
frameworks. Classifications of laws, institutions, and legal orders are
doomed to misrepresent the foreign law and are inevitably subjective and
arbitrary only under the premise that frameworks are insurmountable, a
premise that we have rejected.
Foucault's famous passage does not convince us of anything else.
Foucault leaves the reader under the impression that the Chinese
taxonomy is authentic, and we do not know whether he himself believed
in its authenticity. The Chinese order is, however, purely fictional, an
invention of Louis Borges himself, hence a "western" idea.133 Some may
consider this literary construction as yet another manifestation of
preconceived notions of ostensibly "Asian" logic, which we share when
we adopt Borges' artefact as historically correct. Others may, on the
contrary, take Borges' ingenious invention as a proof that Borges was
able to transgress his (western) confines. In any case, being a fiction, the
"emperor's order" cannot authentically illustrate the complete cultural
relativity of classifications.
Classification (for example, into legal families or cultures) is the result
of a comparison under one or several aspects. Put differently: classifi-
cation means to highlight some (common) aspects and to leave aside
others. The aspects of comparison are pre-selected, but are eventually
adjusted in the process of comparison.134 So in comparative law,
classifications are, as elsewhere, no apriorical givens, but attempts of
ordering. Again, a moderately critical approach is more helpful than
framework-thinking: we must be aware of the fact that categories and
classifications may differ in different cultures, at different times, and we
must realise the ensuing danger of establishing taxonomies that do not
adequately reflect important features of legal systems. Also, we need to
question traditional classifications and dig out unarticulated and latent
ones. But all this does not mean that an outsider can never understand
foreign categories and classifications and translate them (approximately)
into his own categories and classifications, nor does it preclude the
possibility of discovering or inventing suitable and fitting ones.
133. See Umberto Eco, La ricerca delta lingua perfetta netla culiura europea (4th ed. 1993)
at p.222; Jingtai supra n.89.
134. For example, a macro-comparison (and classification) can be undertaken with regard
to the aspect of valid legal sources. This aspect of classification will furnish two classes:
codified (statutory) law and uncodificd, judge-made law. Other possible aspects of
classifying legal systems may be the systems' concept of law, the legal methods applied, the
style of legal thought, or the dominating type of lawyers, the leading theory of interpretation
of law, the leading theory of legitimation of law, and so on.
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5. Functionalism
a) The Post-modernist Critique
The post-modernist critique of functionalism, coined as "better-solution-
comparativism",133 is primarily directed against its implied or outspoken
universalism, its "agenda of sameness".136 In the critical view, functional
resemblances belie deep "disagreements of instinct and inclination in
reasoning about legal problems";137 there are only "chimerical universal
social functions".138 "The focus on functionalism is suited to yielding
results of similarity because it does not stray away from the surface level
of functional results to legal problems to societal, historical, and cultural
underpinnings" writes Vivian Grosswald Curran, and she argues—not
unconvincingly—that the emigr6 generation of comparatists purposely
privileged findings of sameness and underestimated the significance of
reasons because of their personal experience with the Nazi regime, which
had denied human sameness and practised the Shoa.139
The critique also rejects the functionalist claim to objectivity and
neutrality. It holds that the intellectual process, by which the functions of
legal institutions are identified and by which legal institutions are
compared and evaluated, is inescapably subjective, personal, and contest-
able.140 In this view, functionalism is disguised as apolitical, but in reality
"fundamentally conservative, because its emphasis on points of detail
avoids more challenging and radical questions about the role of law in
society."141
b) Discussion
As far as the post-modernist approach eschews functionalism on the
ground that it is inescapably subjective and only seemingly technical and
apolitical, it merely repeats the bias- and the hegemony-arguments in
terms of a critique of functionalism. We have already discussed these two
arguments.
The assertion that the functional approach underestimates fundamen-
tal differences (in legal reasoning, legal culture, societal underpinnings
etc.) flows from framework-thinking, according to which legal thought,
135. Frankenberg (1997) supra n-3 at p.263; see already Hill supra nJ at p.106.
136. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.61.
137. George P. Fletcher, "The Universal and the Particular in Legal Discourse", (1987)
Brigham Young University L.R. 335 at pJ50.
138. Kennedy supra n.l at p.590 n.76.
139. Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at pp.53, 66-78, quotation at p.66 n.76.
140. Hill supra n3 at p.104. See also Kennedy supra n.l at p.561 (pointing out that
functionalism has claimed to be an objective strategy, a way of avoiding the temptation to
subjective judgement and premature closure).
141. Hill supra n.3 at p.107.
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language and judgement are determined by greatly differing and
ultimately irreconcilable frameworks. We have rejected this theory.
The post-modernist claim that functionalism is superficial is justified to
the extent that the functional approach (narrowly conceived) tends to
overstate the quality of law as a rational response to social problems.142
But realising that law serves manifold other purposes does not force us to
say that "function" in its ordinary sense does not matter or that looking at
"functions" is misleading.
Law functions, for instance, as a rhetorical practice that "tells stories
about the culture that helped to shape it and which it in turn helps to
shape", and through which "social data are imaginatively reconstructed
as legal facts and concepts."143 Law may run counter to specific social
needs or interests or may not make a difference.144 It is, therefore,
important to take into account the moral and political aspects of laws that
may not function as social problem-solvers but which have completely
different, even antagonist functions.
Because of the multiplicity of legal functions, which may be situated on
very different levels, and which differ from culture to culture, the
so-called functional approach is not as easily applicable as some
functionalists like to believe and does not produce simple and unambigu-
ous results.145 The numerous functions of the law (political, technical,
social, rhetorical, religious, spiritual, symbolic etc.) may be difficult to
detect and must be weighed in importance. In the absence of "the"
function of law, f unctionality depends on the viewpoint taken. Even if we
look only at the technical surface-level, we will find that a rule may be
laudable with respect to its technical perfection, its enforceability, its
efficacy, its compatibility with other features of the legal system or the
legal security it produces. As Myres S. McDougal once pointed out: "The
demand for inquiring into function is, however, but the beginning of
insight. Further questions are 'functional' for whom, against whom, with
respect to what values, determined by what decision-makers under what
conditions, how, with what effects."14*
142. This objection has been forcefully raised by Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An
Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed. (1993), esp. at pp. 107-118. Watson discovered an
extensive and important practice of legal borrowing. If law on a large scale can be borrowed
from a very different place and survive to a very different time, then there can be no simple
relationship between a society and its law, he concludes.
143. Glendon supra n.40 at pp.8-9. See also Fletcher's critique of functionalism,
advocating an approach that takes the legal discourse and its linguistic particularities as the
starting point of analysis, not superficial functional resemblances supra n.139 at pp.335-351.
144. Frankcnbcrg (1985) supra n.4 at p.437; D. Kokkini-Iatridou, "Some Methodological
Aspects of Comparative Law", (1986) 33 N.I.L.& 143 at p.160.
145. Watson supra n.142 at p.4; Hill supra n.3 at p. 198; see Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at
p.71 n.93 for an example.
146. McDougal supra n.53 at p.219.
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To compare laws under the aspect of economic efficiency is not more
"objective" than comparing them under the aspect of social function. The
difference is that economic efficiency is a narrower criterion, referring to
the particular economic function of a law. Comparative assessments
under the efficiency-aspect may therefore be quite specific and precise.
However, those aspects of an issue which are easiest to measure are not
necessarily the most important ones. To focus on economic efficiency as
the exclusive criterion under which to evaluate laws (as the strict law and
economics approach does), and consequently to compare laws exclusively
under that aspect, reveals a quite reductionist view of the law and its role
in society.
III. TOWARDS A POST-POST-MODERNIST COMPARATIVE LAW
A post-post-modernist approach to comparative law will retain the
(self-)critical impetus of the post-modernist critique, reject the post-
modernist assertion that objectivity is not attainable in comparative law,
and synthesise old and new demands for interdisciplinarity and thought-
ful hermeneutics.
1. With Post-modernism: Heightened Reflexivity
The post-modern critique of comparative law correctly asks for highly
self-conscious and self-critical methodological guidance and for overall
heightened reflexivity.
This first of all suggests the conscious integration of various perspec-
tives and an attentiveness to hidden purposes, meanings, themes,
conceptual building blocks and strategies in legal texts pertaining to
different cultures.147
Secondly, heightened reflexivity comprises an awareness of the
relationship beween one's research and the Zeitgeist, the comparatists'
themes, goals and approaches are shaped by broad intellectual or
theoretical trends and movements, by societal developments and the
political climate. We have mentioned that 19th century historicism and its
nationalist outgrowths have influenced comparative law. Subsequently,
unificatory enthusiasm of the first half of the 20th century was at least in
part a reaction to the atrocities of the First World War and an attempt to
contribute to the efforts of the League of Nations. Socio-functionalism in
comparative law is only one manifestation of the rise of functionalist
approaches in many disciplines, beginning with psychology and sociology.
Finally, the current revitalised interest in harmonisation and unification
has to do with needs created by globalisation and European Union-
147. See for a great example of scholarship French supra n.94 (on the methodological
aspects mentioned here at pp.16,59).
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building. Awareness of these links helps the comparatist to check his
questions and his answers.
Thirdly, the post-modernist critique of comparative law has rightly
underlined the critical potential of comparative legal studies and their
suitability to uncover the extent to which the form and substance of any
legal system result from the implementation of moral and political
values.148 Comparative legal studies are an operator of critique, because
they help to create a critical intellectual distance from one's legal system,
forcing us into sympathetic yet critical knowledge of law in another
context, disrupting our settled understandings, and provoking new
judgements.149 However, this is no new insight, and it has been empha-
sised in many standard textbooks of comparative law.150 It is beautifully
captured in Mary Ann Glendon's description of "Comparative Law as
Shock Treatment".151
2. Against Post-modernism: Objectivity through Mutual Critique and
Intercultural Division of Labour
Of course, the entire comparative process is full of explicit or implicit
choices. The researcher's choice of materials to compare, and of aspects
of comparison/evaluation may depend on political motives, or on other
personal preferences. It always depends on the researcher's personal
store of knowledge, and on the specific objective of research, such as
political intervention, improvement of domestic law, regional harmonis-
ation, mere curiosity etc. Finally, the researcher's choices are likely to be
influenced, as just pointed out, on scholarly trends and traditions.
To that extent, comparison and evaluation is tentative, segmented and
fragmented. But this is inevitable, because every scholar and every
148. Sec, e.g., Hill supra n.3 at p.115.
149. See only Paolo Carozza, "Continuity and Rupture in New Approaches to Compara-
tive Law", (1997) Utah LRcv. 657 at p.663; Mathias Reimann, "Stepping out of the
European Shadow: Why Comparative Law in the United States Must Develop Its Own
Agenda", (1998) 46/4mJ.Comp.L 637 at p.645. According to Frankenberg (1997)jupra n.3
at p.270, comparative law needs u[t]he recognition of the law school as an exotic place, and
of comparative legal work as an exotic practice". Brenda Crossman suggests "turning the
gaze back upon itself" as a comparative methodology to "make explicit the seemingly
inescapable risk of ethnocentrism in the comparative project, while at the same time,
deploying the comparison to challenge that ethnocentrism" (Crossman supra n.72 at p.537).
150. See only SchJesinger et al. supra n.54 at p.39: "To combat an unperceptive and
uncritical attitude toward one's own law is indeed one of the main objectives of teaching
Comparative Law".
151. Mary Ann Glendon, "Comparative Law as Shock Treatment: A Tribute to Jacob W.
F. Sundberg", in Erik Nerep & Wiweka Warnling-Nercp (Eds.), SHrtryck ur: Fcstskrifi till
Jacob W. F. Sundberg (1993) 69 at p.69.
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scientist has to make those or similar choices and cannot investigate
everything under every aspect.152
The necessarily fragmented and "subjective" comparison may be
ill-founded, self-fulfilling, biased, superficial, imprecise, faulty, etc. How-
ever, this does not—contrary to the post-modernist belief—damage
comparative research as a whole. It is a truism in the philosophy of science
that "science and scientific objectivity do not (and cannot) result from the
attempts of an individual scientist to be 'objective', but from the
co-operation of many scientists".133 So scholarship escapes the prejudice
of the point of view of those constructing it through testing and mutual
criticism.154 In comparative law, the results will very likely become sound
in the long run, if criticism comes from all investigated legal cultures.155
A more pragmatic, sociological explanation why discussion and
critique of comparative research really works lies in the division of labour
within the scientific community, which is perhaps the most important
factor of success of modern science and scholarship. It is simply more
effective when everybody does not try to discover everything, but instead
researches a small field thoroughly. This division of labour will function
only if different researchers make use of each others' findings and build
on them. When one scholar considers the results of another researcher,
she will often realise that his results are incompatible with her own
findings, and that the different research results cannot be put together to
create a whole picture. In this case the researcher will try to discover the
causes of this discrepancy, and she will do so by discussion, critique and
scrutiny. The point is: mutual critique and scrutiny naturally flows from
the division of labour because it occurs in every attempt to use others'
results for own research.156
152. This is no excuse for comparative projects that are too narow. In a largely unexplored
field, it is certainly better to have a great diversity of aspects of comparison and to take them
out of different fields instead of restricting oneself to one narrow aspect, e.g. economic
efficiency. So over-specialisation may be counter-productive as well.
153. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1950) at p.403. See with regard to
comparative law Ernst Rabel, "Deutsches und amerikanisches Recto", (1951) 16 Zeiiichrift
fiirauslandischcs und Internationales Privairecht (RabelsZ) 340 at p359: "What remains of
the coloring of the picture by origin anchtducation of the scholar, will be corrected by
international co-operation."
154. Popper calls this "the idea of mutual rational control by critical discussion". Karl R.
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1992) at p.44 n.l.
155. The post-modernist critics' objection is that discussion and rectification is a lure,
because no real communication and collaboration is possible among scholars from different
cultures (Grosswald Curran supra n.6 at p.66 n.76: "a Tower of Babel is the more logical
outcome of international collaboration"). But to deny the possibility of communication is
again mere framework-thinking and a good shield against competition and critique.
156. Sec on the significance of co-operation in science Henry H. Bauer, Scientific Literacy
and the Myth of the Scientific Method (1992) at pp.43-62 et passim.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300064666
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. WWZ Bibliothek, on 16 Aug 2017 at 14:00:17, subject to the Cambridge Core
832 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 49
3. Beyond Post-modernism: Interdisciplinary and Intercultural
Hermeneutics
At all stages of comparative research (data acquisition, analysis and
interpretation of the data, and actual in-depth comparison and eventual
evaluation), the real problems are not moral or cultural blindness,
ethnocentricity and legal imperialism, but the lack of full knowledge and
understanding of foreign legal rules and cultures. Comparatists have—
pure and simple—an incomplete knowledge of many hard facts.1" They
must know something about the historical, social, economic, political,
cultural and psychological context which has made a rule or proposition
what it is. Because thorough knowledge needs hard and extensive study,
excellent language skills, good libraries, long experience, probably
knowledge of life and legal practice within the foreign system, it is rarely
acquired. In practice, the comparatist almost inevitably knows the legal
order better in which she was trained. This asymmetry of knowledge
alone may cause systematic mistakes. For instance, it may often be the
case that—due to incomplete knowledge of details, of the context—the
comparatist over-estimates the possibility of transfer.
Full understanding requires a comprehensive and interdisciplinary
approach. Because "[a] legal order simultaneously encompasses systems
of political arrangements, social relations, interpersonal interactional
practices, economic processes, cultural categorisations, normative
beliefs, psychological habits, philosophical perspectives, and ideological
values",158 we must look not only at rules but at legal cultures, traditions,
ideals, ideologies, identities, and entire legal discourses. This insight is far
from new. Traditional functionalists have called for interdisciplinary
157. "Comparative law is superficial... [It] is hard enough to know in detail one branch of
the law of one system, but to know the history of that branch and its relationship with that of
some other system (and thus to possess a knowledge of the history of that as well) is
well-nigh impossible." (Watson supra n.142 at p.10).
158. Ainsworth supra n.10 at p.28.
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research, albeit in different terms.159 With regard to the dangers of false
(U.S.-centred, Eurocentric and hegemonic) universalism, interdiscipli-
narity and comprehensiveness appear, however, in a new light. They
direct our attention to the moral and political, eventually technically
dysfunctional, underpinning of rules in a historical, sociological and
cultural perspective. So interdisciplinarity and comprehensiveness are a
conditio sine qua non for avoiding erroneous assumptions on ostensibly
"identical" societal problems and erroneous, de-contextualized evalu-
ations of legal solutions.
The program just laid out does not inevitably manoeuvre itself into a
"hermeneutic compulsion", as the critique formulates.160 This term is
meant to explain that comprehensive, understanding comparison consti-
tutes an infinite task because the standards of research and the
pre-conditions for true understanding are so high and demanding that
they can never be reached.
However, far from being under hermeneutic compulsion, comparative
law after post-modernism can refer to the booming field of intercultural
159. Already Pierre Lepaulle, "The Function of Comparative Law", (1921-1922) 35
Harv.LRev. 838 at p.853: "First, it must be clear that a comparison restricted to one legal
phenomenon in two countries is unscientific and misleading. A legal system is a unity, the
whole of which expresses itself in each part; the same blood runs in the whole organism. An
identical provision of the law of two countries may have wholly different moral
backgrounds, may have been brought about by the interplay of wholly different forces and
hence the similarity may be due to the purest coincidence—no more significant than the
double meaning of a pun." Likewise, Rabel wrote in 1925,supra n.45 at p.5: "The material of
reflection about legal problems must be the law of the entire globe, past and present, the
relation of the law to the land, the climate, and race, with historical fates of peoples,—war,
revolution, state-building, subjugation—, with religious and moral conceptions; ambitions
and creative power of individuals; need of goods production and consumption; interests of
ranks, parties, classes. Intellectual currents of all kinds are at work ... Everything is
conditioned on everything else in social, economic and legal design." See also Rothacker,
supra n.22 at p.31: "All comparison in a particular field of culture" must be done "with
methodical attention to all other comparative sciences". "Hence no constitutional
comparison, legal comparison etc. without information by analogous methods, problems,
apories, results of comparative history of economics, religious history, history of languages,
history of arts etc"
160. Berman, supra n.4 at pp.284-285.
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hermeneutics.161 Actually, classic hermeneutics162 is one of the intellectual
roots of post-modernist theory, and modernised versions can usefully be
brought back to the fore. Intercultural hermeneutics realises that the
cultural Other is in principle not different from the intra-cultural or
historical Other. As historical distance can be revealed and described
through the interpretation of historical texts, cultural distance can be
revealed, described, and conveyed. Intercultural hermeneutics thus
presupposes, searches, finds and enlarges the overlaps between different
cultures and philosophies. These overlaps make cross-cultural communi-
cation and understanding possible.163 As do languages, legal institutions
differ from each other, but they are translatable—not perfectly, but at
least approximately.
The quest for scientific rigor, careful study, attention to detail and to
context is no compulsion, but a question of good scholarship. Only under
the framework-premise is such study infinite because, only under that
premise is the Other un-understandable, unrepresentable, incomparable.
To scorn scrupulous scholarship as "chastened search for true under-
standing" and to disparage "all this ego suppression and careful
listening"164 is a good excuse for not even trying.
161. See already in the eighties Holenstein supra n.76, most recently the focus section
"Interkulturelle Kompetenz und Hermeneutik" in (1999) 47 Deutsche Zeitschrift fOr
Philosophic 407-477 with contributions by Hans Julius Schneider, Joachim Matthes, Axel
Horstmann, JUrgcn Straub/Shingo Shimada; Rosa supra n.72 at pp. 10-42. See also Elmar
Holenstein, "Intra- und interkulturelle Hermeneutik", in idem, Kulturphilosophische
Perspektiven (1998) 257-287; Heinz Kimmerle & Franz M. Wimmcr (Eds.), Philosophy and
Democracy in Intercultural Perspective 1997; Notker Schneider, Ram A. Mall & Dieter
Lohmar (Eds.), Einheit und Vielfall: Das Verslchen der Kulluren (1998).
162. Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Hermeneutik", in idem, Schriften (Andreas Arndt Ed.,
1996), pp.945-991 (orig. 1819); Wilhelm Dilthey, "Plan der Forsetzung zum Aufbau der
geschichtlichen Welt in den Gcisteswissenschaftcn", in idem, Cesammelte Schriften, Vol.
VII (4th ed. 1965), 189, at 216-220; Martin Heidegger, Scin und Zeit (15th ed. 1976), 531-32
(pp.142-153) (orig. 1927); Hans Georg-Gadamcr, "Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Meth-
ode", in idem, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 1 (6th ed. 1990) (orig. 1960).
163. Axel Horstmann, "Interkulturelle Hermeneutik: Einc neue Theorie des Verste-
hens?," (1999) 47 Deuuche Zeitschrift fOr Philosophic 427 at p.438.
164. Kennedy supra n.l, at pp.590 n.76 and 591.
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